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CASENOTES
JACKSON V. BIRMINGHAM BOARD OF EDUCATION:
EXPANDING THE CLASS OF THE PROTECTED, OR
PROTECTING THE PROTECTORS?
I. INTRODUCTION
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX") pro-
hibits any school receiving federal funds from discriminating on
the basis of gender.1 While best known in the realm of female ath-
letic programs, Title IX offers a broad array of protections to any-
one who experiences discriminatory treatment on the basis of sex
in a federally funded educational setting.2 Section 901 of Title IX
broadly provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."3
As written, Title IX does not expressly provide any private
cause of action for victims of gender discrimination.4 Implied pri-
vate causes of action have long been recognized, however, with
the Supreme Court of the United States and the lower federal
courts consistently interpreting Title IX and its racial discrimina-
1. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX § 901, 86 Stat. 373
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000)).
2. See generally Diane Heckman, On the Eve of Title IX's 25th Anniversary: Sex Dis-
crimination in the Gym and Classroom, 21 NoVA L. REV. 545 (1997).
3. Education Amendments § 901(a) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)
(2000)).
4. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 683 (1979) ('The statute does not.
expressly authorize a private right of action by a person injured by a violation of § 901.").
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tion parallel statute, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' ("Ti-
tle VI"), with a broad brush.6
The specific class of those protected under Title IX, however,
has not previously been clearly delineated by the Supreme Court.
Many assume that Title IX only protects females subjected to dis-
criminatory treatment,7 but cases exist where males have been
discriminated against in furtherance of traditional gender stereo-
types.' Whether Title IX's protection from sex discrimination also
includes protection from retaliation has been another problem
area.9 While retaliation has been recognized as a form of dis-
crimination under other civil rights statutes, ° the Supreme Court
had not previously addressed whether Title IX provided an im-
plied cause of action for victims of retaliation, particularly for in-
direct victims of retaliation, who are not personally subject to dis-
crimination on the basis of their own gender, but are retaliated
5. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4a (2000); see,
e.g., Mock v. S.D. Bd. of Regents, 2003 DSD 11, 6, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1019 ("[Clases
interpreting Title VI and Title IX may be used interchangeably in analyzing similar issues
under both titles.").
6. See N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) ("There is no doubt
that 'if we are to give [Title IX] the scope that its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep
as broad as its language.'" (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966) (sub-
stitution in original))); see also Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999)(recognizing a cause of action under Title IX for sexual harassment); Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (allowing for recovery of monetary damages under
Title IX).
7. In Justice Thomas's dissent in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, he
stated that "virtually every case in which this Court has addressed Title IX concerned a
claimant who sought to recover for discrimination because of her own sex." 125 S. Ct.
1497, 1512 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The list of cases referenced
to support this statement, however, includes Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, a
case involving a male plaintiff suing to gain academic credit at a women-only nursing
school. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
8. See supra note 7. See generally Note, Cheering on Women and Girls in Sports: Us-
ing Title IX to Fight Gender Role Oppression, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1627, 1633 n.54 (1996).
9. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Are Anti-Retaliation Regulations in Title VI or Title
IX Enforceable in a Private Right of Action: Does Sandoval or Sullivan Control This Ques-
tion?, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 47 (2004); Diane Heckman, Lowrey v. Texas A & M Univer-
sity Systems: Title IX vis-&-vis Title VII Sex Discrimination and Retaliation in Educa-
tional Employment, 124 EDUC. L. REP. 753 (1998).
10. The Supreme Court has interpreted 42 U.S.C. sections 1982 and 1983 as prohibit-
ing retaliation. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (holding that §
1982 implicitly bars retaliatory discrimination); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (holding that § 1983 can be used to enforce freedom against re-
taliation for exercise of free speech).
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against for their complaints about gender discrimination against
others."
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Jackson v. Birming-
ham Board of Education2 has expanded the protections of Title
IX to allow this cause of action. 3 Part II of this note discusses the
general history of Title IX, implied causes of action under Title
IX, and retaliatory discrimination. Part III presents the factual
and procedural background of the Jackson decision and the hold-
ing of the Court. Part IV analyzes the majority and dissenting
opinions of Jackson. Part V considers the impact that Jackson
could have on Title IX in particular and implied causes of action
in civil rights statutes in general.
II. HISTORY
A. Legislative History and Structure of Title IX
1. Title IX's Creation and Relationship with Titles VI and VII
Title IX was created to provide equal protection to the sexes in
federally funded educational settings and to ensure that victims
of gender discrimination would receive "effective protection." 4 Ti-
tle IX was modeled after Title VI, and its description of the class
of intended beneficiaries is identical to that of Title VI, except
that it substitutes "sex" for "race, color, or national origin." 5 Ti-
tles VI and IX have been held sufficiently parallel such that case
interpretation of either one is applicable to the other. 6
Both Titles VI and IX were created by Congress as an exercise
of its spending power, and are therefore in the nature of a con-
tract. 7 The Supreme Court has held that Congress must clearly
indicate the conditions of federal funding to recipients, so that
11. See supra note 9.
12. 125 S. Ct. 1497 (2005).
13. Id. at 1509-10.
14. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704.
15. Id. at 694-95.
16. See supra note 5.
17. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) ("[Llegislation
enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract ... [and] thus
rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 'contract.'").
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they can enter the contractual relationship with full knowledge of
its terms."8 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"),' 9
although frequently implicated in discussions of Titles VI and IX,
was created under Congress's commerce clause power and is a
significantly different statute.2 °
2. Structure and Context of Title IX
Title IX is written broadly, using general terms: only discrimi-
nation "on the basis of sex" is prohibited, and no specific examples
of discrimination are given.21 It has therefore been read broadly
by the courts to "cover[] a wide range of intentional unequal
treatment; by using such a broad term, Congress gave the statute
a broad reach."22
Title IX was passed in 1972, only three years after the Su-
preme Court's decision in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.2"
In Sullivan, the Court held that discrimination included retalia-
tion;24 this broad reading of discrimination has since been applied
to many Title IX cases,25 and the Court has stated that Congress
was presumptively aware of the Sullivan decision and its impact
when it drafted Title IX.
21
18. Id. "[Ihf Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it
must do so unambiguously." Id.
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-4 (2000).
20. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1998) (differen-
tiating protections enumerated in Title VII from those judicially implied under Title IX);
Mank, supra note 9, at 84-91.
21. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
22. Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1505; see supra note 6.
23. 396 U.S. 229 (1969). This case involved racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §
1982, where a white man assigned his lease in a corporation to a black man and was re-
taliated against by his fellow shareholders. Id. at 234-35. The Court held that "[iif that
sanction [Sullivan's expulsion for speaking out for civil rights] can be imposed, then Sulli-
van is punished for trying to vindicate the rights of minorities," and therefore a cause of
action must be provided for the victim of retaliatory discrimination. Id. at 237.
24. Id. at 237. Sullivan also holds that "[tihe existence of a statutory right implies the
existence of all necessary and appropriate remedies." Id. at 239.
25. See supra note 6.
26. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 698-99 (1979) ("[Ilt is not only appropriate but also realistic
to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with these unusually important prece-
dents .. .and that it expected [Title IX's] enactment to be interpreted in conformity with
them.").
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B. Implied Causes of Action under Title IX
1. The Title IX Statute Provides Only Poor Procedural
Protections for Victims
The text of Title IX does not provide a private cause of action
for victims of discrimination;27 the courts have therefore implied a
cause of action.2' As the Court explained in Cannon v. University
of Chicago,29 the only remedy provided by the text of Title IX is an
administrative mechanism for terminating an educational insti-
tution's funding if it discriminates on the basis of sex. ° Under the
regulations for Title IX's explicit enforcement mechanism,
"[c]omplainants enjoy few rights."31 In the interest of promoting
Congress's intent to protect private individuals from discrimina-
tion, therefore, the courts have long implied a cause of action un-
der Title IX. 2
2. Prior Supreme Court Cases Establish a Broad Cause of Action
under Titles VI and IX
After determining that Title IX did provide an implied cause of
action, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of the statute's
protection against discrimination in a series of decisions. In
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,3 the Court held that
Title IX's implied cause of action allowed for monetary damages
to the victim of gender-based discrimination.34 In Gebser v. Lago
Vista Independent School District,3" the Court interpreted the dis-
crimination prohibited by Title IX as including sexual harass-
ment of a student by a teacher, so long as the school district had
27. See supra note 4.
28. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 709 ("Not only the words and history of Title IX, but also its
subject matter and underlying purposes, counsel implication of a cause of action in favor of
private victims of discrimination.").
29. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
30. Id. at 695-96.
31. Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1504.
32. Mank, supra note 9, at 61; 34 C.F.R. § 100.7 (2004).
33. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
34. Id. at 76. Franklin, a high school student, brought a Title IX action for damages
from alleged sexual harassment by a coach and teacher. Id. at 63-64.
35. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
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actual notice of the harassment and acted in "deliberate indiffer-
ence" to that violation.36 Finally, in Davis v. Monroe County
Board of Education," the Court held that student-on-student
sexual harassment, provided it rose above the level of "teasing
and name-calling," was in violation of Title IX's prohibition on
discrimination."
C. Protection Against Retaliatory Discrimination in Title IX and
Other Civil Rights Statutes
1. Other Civil Rights Statutes Recognize a Cause of Action for
Retaliation
Title VII expressly includes retaliation in the conduct prohib-
ited as discrimination.39 While it could be argued that Congress
could have included retaliation specifically in other civil rights
statutes if it had meant it to be prohibited as discrimination, the
Court has generally implied a cause of action for retaliatory dis-
crimination under other civil rights statutes. ° In broad terms,
the Court has held that "where federally protected rights have
been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts
will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary
relief."41
2. Title IX Regulations Prohibit Retaliation
The Department of Education's regulations interpreting Title
IX expressly prohibit retaliation, stating clearly that "[nio recipi-
ent or other person shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or dis-
36. Id. at 292-93. Gebser was subjected to sexual harassment by a teacher, but there
was no evidence that school officials knew of the ongoing harassment. Id. at 277-79.
37. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
38. Id. at 652. Davis's minor daughter, a fifth-grade student, was subject to significant
student-on-student sexual harassment which affected her school performance; school offi-
cials knew of the situation but took no disciplinary action against the offending student.
Id. at 633-36. The Court specifically held that damages for student-on-student sexual
harassment were available "only where the behavior is so severe, pervasive, and objec-
tively offensive that it denies its victims the equal access to education that Title IX is de-
signed to protect." Id. at 652.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
40. See supra note 10.
41. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
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criminate against any individual for the purpose of interfering
with any right or privilege secured by section 601 of the Act."
42
This prohibition on retaliatory discrimination would seem to in-
clude both direct and indirect victims, because it is written to pro-
tect "any individual" protesting the interference of another with
"any right or privilege."43
Courts generally give great deference to interpretive regula-
tions from the agencies charged with implementing statutes.44
The Supreme Court's decision in Alexander v. Sandoval,45 how-
ever, established that regulations cannot create a right beyond
that which Congress intended to create in drafting the underlying
statute.46 Prior to the Jackson decision, then, it was unclear
whether the Court would interpret Title IX as including a. prohi-
bition on retaliation, or whether the Court would find that the
Department of Education's regulations attempted to expand the
protections of the statute impermissibly.
3. The Eleventh Circuit Decision in Jackson Marked a Circuit
Split
Prior to the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Jackson, the Circuit
Courts of Appeals were in basic agreement that Title IX provided
an implied cause of action for retaliatory discrimination, at least
for direct victims of gender discrimination and retaliation.47 The
42. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) (2004).
43. Id.
44. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
("We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer...
45. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
46. Id. This case involved Title VI regulations that prohibited disparate impact dis-
crimination, while the text of Title VI only prohibits intentional discrimination. Id. at 280-
82. The Court held that "[1]anguage in a regulation may invoke a private right of action
that Congress through statutory text created, but it may not create a right that Congress
has not." Id. at 291.
47. Compare Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. Of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2002),
with Lowrey v. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 252 (5th Cir. 1997) ("[Elvery federal
court to consider this issue has held that teachers may state claims for retaliation under
title IX. We join these courts in concluding that title IX affords an implied cause of action
for retaliation.") (internal citations omitted), and Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River
Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1994) ("Retaliation against an employee for filing a
claim of gender discrimination is prohibited under Title IX.").
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federal district courts, however, were not so clearly decided on the
issue."
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New
River Community College49 considered whether a cause of action
existed for an individual who had allegedly been discriminated
against, had filed a claim under Title IX, and was then not hired
for another position, apparently in retaliation for the Title IX
claim.5" The Fourth Circuit held that a cause of action was avail-
able under Title IX for retaliatory discrimination.5' The recent
Fourth Circuit case of Peters v. Jenney52 is in accord with Preston,
holding that Title VI's prohibition of intentional discrimination
implies a cause of action for retaliation."
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Lowrey v. Texas A & M
University System5 4 held that a direct victim of retaliation had an
implied cause of action under Title IX.55 Each of these decisions,
however, referred to the Department of Education's Title IX regu-
lations (and predated the decision in Alexander v. Sandoval56 ),
and each dealt with a direct victim of retaliatory discrimination
who had already been subject to gender discrimination.57
48. Compare Johnson v. Galen Health Insts., Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 679 (W.D. Ky.
2003), and Chandamuri v. Georgetown Univ., 274 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2003), with Mock
v. S.D. Bd. of Regents, 2003 DSD 11, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1017.
49. 31 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 1994).
50. Id. Preston was employed as a counselor for student support services, and filed a
Title IX suit alleging that the College had discriminated against her through its hiring
practices. Id. at 205. Preston later applied for two other counselor positions, but was not
awarded either one. Id.
51. Id. at 206 ("Retaliation against an employee for filing a claim of gender discrimi-
nation is prohibited under Title IX."). However, the court also found that Preston would
not have been hired "even if she had not filed the discrimination claim," and therefore, the
College had not violated Title IX. Id. at 208.
52. 327 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2003).
53. Id. at 318 ("Retaliation of this sort bears such a symbiotic and inseparable rela-
tionship to intentional racial discrimination that an agency could reasonably conclude that
Congress meant to prohibit both, and to provide a remedy for victims of either.").
54. 117 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1997).
55. Id. at 252. Lowrey, after participating in Title IX complaints and investigations
against the university where she was employed, was passed over for a promotion and sub-
sequently removed from her position as Women's Athletic Coordinator. Id. at 244. The
court concluded "only that the employees of federally funded educational institutions who
raise complaints, or participate in investigations, concerning compliance with the substan-
tive provisions of title IX are protected from retaliation." Id. at 254.
56. 532 U.S. 275 (2001); see supra note 46.
57. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
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III. BACKGROUND OF THE JACKSON DECISION
Roderick Jackson was hired by the Birmingham Board of Edu-
cation ("the Board") in 1993 as a physical education teacher and
coach for the girls' basketball team.58 After being transferred to
Ensley High School in August 1999, Jackson learned that the
girls' team was inadequately funded and lacked equal access to
athletic facilities. 9 Beginning in December 2000, Jackson com-
plained to his supervisors about this inequality, but rather than
addressing the alleged discrimination, in May 2001 the Board
removed Jackson as the girls' basketball coach.6 °
Jackson brought suit against the Board in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama under Title
IX, claiming that his dismissal as coach was in retaliation for his
complaints about sex discrimination in the high school's sports.
61
The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that Title IX
does not prohibit retaliation and does not provide a cause of ac-
tion for victims of retaliatory discrimination.62 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's decision that Title IX did not pro-
vide an implied cause of action for retaliation, in contradiction to
decisions from several other circuits.6 ' The Eleventh Circuit held
that, under Sandoval, the Department of Education's regulations
prohibiting retaliation did not create a cause of action, and cer-
tainly did not protect Jackson, as he is outside the class of per-
sons intended to be protected by the statute-direct victims of
gender discrimination. 6'
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to
resolve the conflict between the circuits and to clarify Title IX's
58. Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1503.
59. Id.
60. Id. Jackson was retained as a teacher, but no longer received the supplemental
coaching pay. Id. Because the district court dismissed Jackson's suit under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted
without considering the facts of the case, the Supreme Court assumed the truth of Jack-
son's allegations-that he was relieved as the girls' basketball coach in retaliation for his
complaints about gender discrimination. Id. (citing Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500
U.S. 322,325 (1991)).
61. Id. The district court's decision was not published.
62. Id.; see supra notes 10 and 40 and accompanying text.
63. Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1503 (citing Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1333).
64. Id. (citing Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 275).
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protections against gender discrimination.65 In a five-to-four deci-
sion written by Justice O'Connor, the Court reversed the Elev-
enth Circuit, holding that retaliation for complaints of gender
discrimination is itself intentional discrimination on the basis of
sex, and therefore is protected by Title IX's implied private cause
of action.66 Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion argued instead
that the plain language of Title IX did not meet the requirements
for imposing a cause of action for retaliation."
IV. ANALYSIS OF JACKSON'S MAJORITY AND DISSENTING OPINIONS
A. Majority Opinion6"
1. The Broad Language and Legislative History of Title IX
Establish that Discrimination Should Be Read Broadly to
Include Retaliation
The majority held that retaliation due to complaints of gender
discrimination "constitutes intentional 'discrimination' 'on the ba-
sis of sex,"' and is therefore prohibited by Title IX.69 Justice
O'Connor reasoned that Congress wrote Title IX in broad, sweep-
ing terms, and "by using such a broad term [as discrimination],
Congress gave the statute a broad reach." ° While Title VII, for
example, mentions retaliation specifically,71 the majority distin-
guished Title VII as "a vastly different statute from Title IX."72
Title VII lists specific practices that constitute discrimination,
whereas Title IX simply prohibits discrimination.73 Consequently,
the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted Title IX broadly
to recognize that Congress intended to prohibit all forms of gen-
der discrimination.74
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1502, 1507.
67. Id. at 1510 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
68. The majority opinion was written by Justice O'Connor, who was joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. at 1502.
69. Id. at 1504.
70. Id. at 1505.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
72. Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1505.
73. See supra note 20.
74. See Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1504-05; see supra note 6.
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Further, the majority discussed the legislative context in which
Title IX was drafted, only three years after the Supreme Court's
decision in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,75 where "[the Court]
interpreted a general prohibition on racial discrimination to cover
retaliation."76 Congress was aware of the Sullivan decision at the
time it created Title IX, and the Supreme Court has held that
Congress presumably intended discrimination to have the broad
meaning then in use, including a prohibition on retaliatory dis-
crimination.77
2. The Department of Education's Regulations Prohibiting
Retaliation Are Unnecessary for the Court's Decision
Justice O'Connor disagreed with the Board's argument that the
Sandoval decision controlled this case.7" Under Sandoval, the
Court found that regulations could not create a cause of action
beyond that intended by Congress in drafting a statute.79 The
Board argued that the Department of Education regulations °
prohibiting retaliation under Title IX could not create this cause
of action for retaliatory discrimination, because this would violate
Sandoval."l The majority, however, found it unnecessary to con-
sider the regulations to reach the conclusion that Title IX prohib-
its retaliation. 2 The majority's holding that retaliation violates
Title IX did "not rely on the Department of Education's regulation
at all, because the statute itself contains the necessary prohibi-
tion," and is thus in accord with Sandoval.3
3. Protection for All Victims of Retaliation Is Necessary to
Enforce Title IX
Justice O'Connor, having found that "retaliation falls within
the statute's prohibition of intentional discrimination on the basis
75. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
76. Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1505.
77. Id. at 1506; see supra note 6.
78. See Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1506.
79. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291; see supra note 46.
80. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) (2004).
81. Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1506.
82. Id. at 1506-07.
83. Id. at 1507 (emphasis in original).
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of sex," next considered whether this protection applies to an in-
direct victim such as Jackson.' Contrasting Title IX's "on the ba-
sis of sex" with Title VII's "on the basis of such individual's sex,"
the majority concluded that, had Congress meant to limit the pro-
tections of Title IX to direct victims, it could have used this spe-
cific language.85 As written, the statute's broad wording does not
require that the victim of retaliation also have been a direct vic-
tim of the original gender discrimination. 6
Justice O'Connor also considered Congress's purpose in draft-
ing Title IX, to protect individuals from sex discrimination in the
educational setting." Finding that, "if retaliation were not pro-
hibited, Title IX's enforcement scheme would unravel," the major-
ity held that Congress must have intended for Title IX to include
protection against retaliation. 8 Bolstering the conclusion that in-
direct victims of retaliatory discrimination should also be allowed
a cause of action, Justice O'Connor pointed out that "teachers and
coaches such as Jackson are often in the best position to vindicate
the rights of their students." 9
4. The Board Had Notice that Retaliation Was Prohibited under
Title IX
Finally, the majority considered the Board's argument that Ti-
tle IX, as an exercise of Congress's spending power, must clearly
impose conditions for receipt of funds, and that the Board did not
have notice that retaliation was prohibited under Title IX.9° Jus-
tice O'Connor clearly agreed that notice of conditions is essential
for funding recipients under Title IX, but disagreed with the
Board's assertion that retaliatory discrimination was not clearly
prohibited as a condition for the receipt of federal funds.9' Be-
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1508; see also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704 ("[Congress] wanted [Title IX] to pro-
vide individual citizens effective protection against [discriminatory] practices." (internal
quotations and citation omitted)).
88. Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1508. The Court further asserted, "We should not assume
that Congress left such a gap in its scheme." Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1508-09; see also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
91. Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1509.
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cause retaliation is necessarily an intentional action, and Title IX
clearly prohibits intentional discrimination on the basis of sex,
"Title IX itself therefore supplied sufficient notice to the Board
that it could not retaliate against Jackson."9 2 The majority also
cited to the Supreme Court's consistently broad interpretation of
discrimination and the Department of Education regulations in
concluding that the Board should have known that retaliation
was prohibited under Title IX.9
B. Justice Thomas's Dissent94
Justice Thomas argued that Section 901 of Title IX does not
meet the three requirements for implying a cause of action for re-
taliation: first, that under the plain meaning of the statute, re-
taliation is not discrimination on the basis of sex; second, that
Congress's conditions on funding recipients must be unambigu-
ously imposed; and third, that the statute must "evince a plain
intent to provide such a cause of action."95
Justice Thomas rejected the majority's holding that retaliation
is intentional discrimination on the basis of sex, arguing that dis-
crimination in violation of Title IX must be on the basis of the
plaintiffs sex, "not the sex of some other person."96 Justice Tho-
mas asserted that both Congress and the Supreme Court "used
the phrase 'on the basis of sex' as a shorthand for discrimination
'on the basis of such individual's sex."'97 Further, the dissent cor-
rectly pointed out that the elements for satisfaction of a retalia-
tion claim do not require that discrimination has actually oc-
curred;9" therefore, a retaliation claim may succeed in the absence
of any Title IX-prohibited discrimination.99 Justice Thomas ar-
gued that protection against retaliation is therefore a "separate
and distinct right," not to be confused with the right to be free of
92. Id. at 1510.
93. Id.
94. Justice Thomas's dissent was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Kennedy. Id. at 1510.
95. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 1511 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
97. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 1512 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
99. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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gender discrimination under Title IX. Because Title IX fails to
specifically mention retaliation, whereas other civil rights stat-
utes expressly prohibit retaliation, the dissent asserted that Title
IX does not provide protection from retaliation."°
Whereas the majority held that notice was adequately provided
to funding recipients that retaliation for complaints of gender dis-
crimination would be in violation of Title IX's protections, Justice
Thomas argued that conduct such as retaliation which is not
clearly discrimination on the basis of sex is not prohibited by Title
IX; funding recipients therefore cannot have had notice that their
funds were conditioned on avoiding the appearance of retalia-
tion.102 Justice Thomas went on to state that "[tihe Board, and
other Title IX recipients, must now assume that if conduct can be
linked to sex discrimination-no matter how attenuated that
link-this Court will impose liability under Title IX." °3
Finally, in order for the Court to imply a cause of action, the
statute must clearly create such a right, and the plaintiff must be
included in the intended class of beneficiaries.' 4 Justice Thomas
argued that Title IX does not clearly demonstrate Congress's in-
tent to create a private right of action for retaliation, and implied
that Jackson, as an indirect victim of gender discrimination,
would be outside the intended class of beneficiaries even if Title
IX included retaliation 05 Further, Justice Thomas asserted that
the majority misinterpreted Sullivan, and consequently the legis-
lative history surrounding the drafting of Title IX. 1°6 Under Jus-
tice Thomas's narrow interpretation of Sullivan, the legislative
context of Title IX is not such that discrimination would clearly
100. Id. at 1513 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 1513-14 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 1514-15 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas interpreted Gebser and
Davis more narrowly than the majority, arguing that these cases merely included sexual
harassment as a form of discrimination, rather than compelling a "broad" reading of the
statute. Id. at 1514 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ.,
526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998)).
103. Id. at 1515 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
104. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283-84 (2002) (citing Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576 (1979); Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 691-92 &
n.13 (1979)).
105. See Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1515-16 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1516 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The majority's reliance on Sullivan . . . is
wholly misplaced."). The dissent argues that, rather than expanding the definition of dis-
crimination to include retaliatory discrimination, Sullivan established only that the plain-
tiff had standing to bring a suit on behalf of one subject to racial discrimination. Id. (Tho-
mas, J., dissenting) (citing Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969)).
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include retaliation, and no congressional intent to include retalia-
tory claims in Title IX is evident. ' °7
V. POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE JACKSON DECISION
A. Implied Private Rights of Action under Civil Rights Statutes
Many civil rights statutes already include retaliation in their
anti-discrimination mandates, either expressly or impliedly
through by the judiciary."0 ' Because protection against retaliation
is potentially critical to protection from discrimination in the first
place,'0 9 it seems logical that retaliation would be interpreted as
another form of discrimination. Thus, the Jackson decision could
be viewed as bringing Title IX into line with other statutes,
rather than as creating a new cause of action or a new interpreta-
tion of discrimination.
Some have already attempted, unsuccessfully, to use Jackson's
holding to expand other civil rights statutes, as in the recent case
Jones v. United Parcel Service," where a disabled individual
sought a private cause of action for his employer's alleged viola-
tion of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973."' The plaintiff argued that
an implied private right of action should be created for the Reha-
bilitation Act in light of the expansion of these rights under Jack-
son.'12 The district court refused to allow this cause of action,
finding that Jackson had not in fact extended the Title IX statute,
but rather had upheld its broad interpretation of discrimina-
tion. 11
3
Justice Thomas is clearly concerned that such judicially im-
plied causes of action stand to trample Congress's legislative
power, stating that "the majority substitutes its policy judgments
for the bargains struck by Congress, as reflected in the statute's
text."" 4 At least in Jackson, however, the majority makes the bet-
107. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
108. See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also text accompanying note 34.
109. See supra notes 22, 46, and 80 and accompanying text.
110. 378 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (D. Kan. 2005).
111. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (2000).
112. Jones, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 1314.
113. Id.
114. Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1517 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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ter argument. It seems, by the context of Title IX's enactment,115
the broad, non-specific terms used in the statute, 116 the Depart-
ment of Education's regulations interpreting Title IX," 7 and the
overall direction of the Supreme Court's holdings interpreting
civil rights statutes," 8 that Congress intended for Title IX to be
broadly interpreted and has approved of the executive and judi-
cial branches' interpretations of the statute.
B. Expanding the Class of the Protected, or Upholding the
Definition of Discrimination?
The impact of the Jackson decision may very well not be sig-
nificant, as it was a close five-to-four decision. Sandoval was also
a five-to-four decision, and the Justices have clearly differed in
how it should be interpreted."9 Only Justice O'Connor has
changed her position for the Jackson decision; otherwise the Jus-
tices have held to their positions supporting or opposing the ex-
pansion of implied causes of action for Titles VI and IX. 2'
By holding that retaliation is part of Title IX's definition of dis-
crimination, however, the Court did not actually expand the class
of intended beneficiaries under Title IX; it merely included all
victims of retaliation under the umbrella of those "discriminated"
against "on the basis of sex."' 2 ' While the Court could narrow its
definition of discrimination in the future to exclude indirect vic-
tims of discrimination, it need not interpret Jackson as expanding
the class of the protected under Title IX. Jackson upheld the pur-
pose of ensuring equal treatment for the sexes in the educational
setting by guaranteeing an enforcement mechanism and protec-
tion for those protectors of civil rights who seek to enforce gender
equality; the decision does not necessarily create any imaginable
115. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
119. See generally Mank, supra note 9.
120. Compare the Justices' positions in Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1497, with their positions in
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275.
121. Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1507 ("The complainant is himself a victim of discrimina-
tory retaliation, regardless of whether he was the subject of the original complaint.").
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cause of action for any victim of alleged discrimination that has
anything to do with gender, as the dissent would argue.122
Practically, even the dissent's slippery slope argument that
discrimination on the basis of sex could now include any conduct
remotely related to gender falls flat.'23 Institutions, as we all do,
will seek to correct a problem using the path of least resistance. If
a particular individual is creating a problem for the school by
complaining about sex discrimination, and the school finds it eas-
ier to fire the individual than to fix the underlying discrimina-
tion, further discrimination has occurred and will continue to oc-
cur.124 On the other hand, a school that investigates claims of
gender discrimination and documents its findings before repri-
manding a complainant will not need to fear claims of retaliation
under Title IX. In the absence of discrimination, presumably the
courts would find no rational basis for a claim of retaliation.
While the elements of a retaliation claim require only a reason-
able belief that discrimination has occurred,125 open communica-
tion and proactive avoidance of gender discrimination should pre-
clude any reasonable person from suspecting discrimination
where none is in fact occurring; this proactive approach may be
just what Congress envisioned when it drafted Title IX.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Jackson decision will likely be interpreted only as includ-
ing retaliation within the Title IX definition of discrimination,
rather than as greatly expanding the class of the protected for
other civil rights statutes. While the Court did include indirect
victims of retaliatory discrimination in the protected class by de-
fining discrimination broadly,'26 this close five-to-four decision in
a heavily contested area may not stand the test of time, and will
almost certainly be construed as narrowly as possible. At least
one subsequent decision has held to this narrow interpretation,
construing the Jackson case as only expanding the definition of
122. See supra text accompanying note 95.
123. Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1515 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying
note 95.
124. Jackson, at 1504 (concluding that retaliation is an intentional act and a form of
discrimination because the complainant is being subjected to differential treatment).
125. Id. at 1512-13 & n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 1508.
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discrimination within Title IX, rather than as expanding causes
of action for other civil rights statutes. 127 Whether the Court will
allow private rights of action for any indirect victim of retaliatory
discrimination in other civil rights statutes, or whether the class
of the protected will be expanded even further, as the dissent pre-
dicted,'12 remains to be seen.
Cassandra M. Hausrath
127. Jones, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 1314.
128. Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1516 (Thomas, J., dissenting). "By crafting its own addi-
tional enforcement mechanism, the majority returns this Court to the days in which it
created remedies out of whole cloth to effectuate its vision of congressional purpose." Id. at
1517 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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